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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - FIRST AMENDMENT - FREEDOM OF
SPEECH AND PRESS - NEW YORK TIMES STANDARD Is INAPPLICABLE
TO A DEFAMED INDIVIDUAL WHO Is NEITHER A PUBLIC OFFICIAL
NOR A PUBLIC FIGURE; AND ONLY ACTUAL INJURY Is COMPENSABLE
ABSENT SHOWING OF ACTUAL MALICE.
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. (U.S. 1974)
As part of a continuing effort to expose a purported nationwide Com-
munist conspiracy to harass and discredit local law enforcement officials,
respondent Robert Welch published in his monthly periodical Arnerican
Opinion' an article which contended that Chicago policeman Richard
Nuccio had been falsely convicted of murder in the shooting death of
Ronald Nelson. In the article, petitioner Elmer Gertz, who had represented
Nelson's family at the coroner's inquest and at trial in civil litigation
against Nuccio, was described as "Vice President, of the Communist Na-
tional Lawyers Guild, ' 2 a "Leninist," 3 and a "Communist-fronter." ' 4
Petitioner filed a diversity action for libel in the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois, alleging that the statements
published by respondent were false and had damaged his reputation in the
community.5 Ruling that the statements were libelous per se under Illinois
law,6 the trial court withdrew all issues from the jury except that of dam-
1. Stang, FRAME-UP: Richard Nuccio and the War on Police, Am. OPINION,
April, 1969, at 1. American Opinion disseminates the views of the John Birch Society.
2. Id. at 6.
3. Id. at 12.
4. Id. at 17. Furthermore, a picture of the petitioner with the caption "Elmer
Gertz of Red Guild harasses Nuccio" was included in the article. Although petitioner
was described in this manner, his role in the Nuccio affair was not the focus of the
article. The trial court characterized the main theme of the article as:
[M]ore general and far reaching than just the trial of one Chicago policeman for
murder. Instead, it painted the picture of a conspiratorial war being waged by
the Communists against the police in general. Caught up in the web of the alleged
conspiracy, aside from Gertz, was such a disparate cast of characters as the
Lake View Citizens Council, the Walker Report, a Roman Catholic priest, and
the Chicago Seed (an underground newspaper). In fact, although Gertz's pic-
ture was displayed in the body of the article, he did not play a very prominent role
in the article's expose of the purported war on police.
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 322 F. Supp. 997, 998 (N.D. Ill. 1970) (footnote omitted).
5. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 306 F. Supp. 310 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
6. Id. at 311. In the majority of jurisdictions, a libel per se is a written publica-
tion of false words which by their plain and ordinary meaning, are injurious on their
face without resort to innuendo or extrinsic facts to convey the defamatory meaning
(867) 1
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ages.7 Although the jury assessed petitioner's damages at $50,000, the
court granted respondent's motion for judment n.o.v.8 The Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the decision.9 On writ of cer-
tiorari, the United States Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a
new trial, holding that in an action for libel: 1) states may define their
own standard of care to be applied in cases involving defamatory state-
ments about a person who was neither a public official nor a public figure,
even though the statements concerned an issue of public or general concern;
2) compensation to defamed persons must be limited to the actual injury
suffered ;10 and 3) presumed and punitive damages could not be awarded
absent proof of actual malice." Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323
(1974).
intended. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 112, at 763-64 (4th
ed. 1971). In such a case, "the existence of damage [is] conclusively assumed from
the publication of the libel itself, without other evidence that there [is] any damage
at all." Id. at 762.
Early Illinois cases had held that falsely characterizing a person as a Com-
munist was libel per se. See Spanel v. Pegler, 160 F.2d 619, 622 (7th Cir. 1947);
Dilling v. Illinois Publish. and Print. Co., 340 Ill. App. 303, 305, 91 N.E.2d 635, 636
(1950). However, later Illinois appellate court decisions narrowed the definition of
libel per se where extrinsic facts were necessary to make out the defamatory
meaning conveyed. See Coursey v. Greater Niles Township Publish. Corp., 82 Ill.
App. 2d 76, 81-82, 227 N.E.2d 164, 167 (1967) ; Whitby v. Associates Discount Corp.,
59 Ill. App. 2d 337, 340-41, 207 N.E.2d 482, 485 (1965). To be actionable where
extrinsic facts are utilized, the libel must fall into one of four categories: 1) those
imputing the commission of a criminal offense; 2) those imputing a loathsome
disease; 3) those affecting a particular party in his profession, business, or trade; or
4) those imputing unchastity to a woman. See W. PROSSER, supra note 6, at 754-60, 763.
See also Whitby v. Associates Discount Corp., supra, at 340-41, 207 N.E.2d at 484.
7. 322 F. Supp. at 998. The trial judge had previously concluded that even if
the narrowed libel per se category was the present law in Illinois,
plaintiff's complaint nonetheless establishes a per se case of defamation, for it
meets the requirement that the challenged statements "prejudic[e] a particular
party in his profession or trade."
306 F. Supp. at 311, quoting Whitby v. Associates Discount Corp., 59 Ill. App. 2d 337,
340, 207 N.E.2d 482, 484 (1965).
8. 322 F. Supp. at 1000 (N.D. Ill. 1970). Respondent asserted a constitutional
privilege under New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), which the court
concluded should apply, since the defamatory article concerned an issue of public
interest. Id. at 998-1000. Although this privilege may be defeated if the plaintiff
establishes that the defendant published with actual malice, petitioner failed to make
such a showing, and judgment n.o.v. was entered for respondent. Id. at 999-1000.
See notes 12-14 and accompanying text infra.
9. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 471 F.2d 801 (7th Cir. 1972). Although the
court of appeals found for the defendant, thus affirming the district court's decision,
it disagreed with the district court's determination that petitioner was not a public
figure. 471 F.2d at 805. The circuit court stated that petitioner's
stature as a lawyer, author, lecturer, and participant in matters of public import
undermine the validity of the assumption that he is not a "public figure" as the
term has been used by the progeny of New York Times.
Id.
10. For a discussion of the types of injury that are compensable in defamation
actions, see note 77 infra.
11. For a discussion of actual malice, see note 15 infra.
[VOL. 20
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Before considering the impact and rationale of Gertz, the seminal
decision of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan' and several of its progeny
must be examined. In New York Times, the Supreme Court, for the first
time, applied a first amendment freedom of speech and press rationale to
publications about public officials. Dispelling the belief that libel laws did
not infringe upon first and fourteenth amendment rights,'3 the Court stated
that "libel can claim no talismanic immunity from constitutional limitations.
It must be measured by standards that satisfy the First Amendment."1
4
The Court then enunciated the following doctrine, which became known
as the New York Times standard:
The constitutional guarantees require, we think, a federal rule
that prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a defama-
tory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the
statement was made with "actual malice" - that is, with knowledge
that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or
not.
i s
12. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). Defendant New York Times published an advertise-
ment entitled "Heed Their Rising Voices" on behalf of the Committee to Defend
Martin Luther King and the Struggle for Freedom in the South. Id. at 256-57. The
advertisement attempted to raise money for King's defense fund while depicting police
brutality towards the civil rights movement; however, the publication contained
false statements. Id. at 258. While the publication only mentioned the word "police"
and did not mention plaintiff by name, plaintiff alleged that the word "police" referred
to him since he was commissioner in charge of police activities. Id. Affirmance of a
damage award by the Supreme Court of Alabama was reversed by the United States
Supreme Court. Id. at 264, 292.
13. Prior to the New York Times decision, it was generally held that common
law actions for libel did not abridge the first amendment guarantees of speech and of
the press. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 483 (1957) ; Beauharnais v. Illinois,
343 U.S. 250, 266 (1952). See also Pedrick, Freedom of the Press and the Law of
Libel: The Modern Revised Statute, 49 ,CORNELL L.Q. 581, 586 (1964).
14. 376 U.S. at 269.
15. Id. at 279-80. Although the New York Times Court adopted the term actual
malice, which at common law meant feelings of hatred, spite, corrupt motives, or
ill will, it employed the term in a different manner. See Hadlen, Character of Belief
Necessary for the Conditional Privilege in Defamation, 25 ILL. L. REv. 865, 865-67
(1931). The Court stated that actual malice must be proved with "convincing clarity,"
but did not establish any meaningful guidelines to assist plaintiffs in meeting their
burden of proof or to assist judges in properly instructing juries. 376 U.S. at 285-86.
Two subsequent Supreme Court decisions have provided some help in defining
the parameters of "actual malice." In Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964), the
Court stated that "only those false statements made with the high degree of aware-
ness of their probable falsity" would meet the New York Times actual malice standard.
Id. at 74.
In St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968), the Court, after noting
that actual malice "cannot be fully encompassed in one infallible definition," 390 U.S.
at 730, stated:
[It is] clear that reckless conduct is not measured by whether a reasonably
prudent man would have published, or would have investigated before publishing.
There must be sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the defendant in
fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication. Publishing with
such doubts shows reckless disregard for truth or falsity and demonstrates
actual malice.
Id. at 731. The Court then announced several objective criteria to aid in determining
whether defendant's publication of the alleged defamatory statements evinced actual 3
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In adopting this doctrine, the Court acknowledged the problem of
balancing society's interest in maximizing first amendment freedoms of
speech and press with the individual's interest in minimizing injury to his
reputation caused by false statements."0 However, the Court also recog-
nized that "self censorship" would follow from forcing a publisher to guar-
antee the truthfulness of his statements. 1 7 Consequently, in the case of
public officials, the Court declared that any standard of proof less than
actual malice would result in suppression of both falsehoods and worth-
while statements, and thus be constitutionally impermissible.'"
Although the New York Times Court established a constitutional
privilege for defamation, 19 it did not delineate the scope of the privilege.20
It was not until Rosenblatt v. Baer ' that the Court defined public officials
as those "governmental employees who have, or appear to the public to
have, substantial responsibility for control over the conduct of govern-
mental affairs."' 22 As to whether the privilege applied to defamation of
other than public officials, the Supreme Court has successively expanded the
scope of the New York Times doctrine.
malice or reckless disregard: actual malice could be found if the statement "[was]
fabricated by the defendant, [was] the product of his imagination, [was] based wholly
on an unverified anonymous telephone call," or "where there [were] obvious reasons
to doubt the veracity of the informant or the accuracy of his reports." Id. at 732
(footnote omitted). See generally Comment, Calculated Misstatements of Fact Not
Protected by First Amendment Guarantees of Free Speech and Press, 1969 UTAH
L. REV. 118.
16. See 376 U.S. at 267-70.
17. 376 U.S. at 279.
18. Id.
19. See notes 13 & 14 and accompanying text supra.
20. 376 U.S. at 283 n.23.
21. 383 U.S. 75 (1966).
22. Id. at 83 (footnote omitted). Plaintiff, a former county recreation supervisor,
alleged that a newspaper column contained defamatory falsehoods concerning his
handling of finances as supervisor of a ski resort. Id. at 77-79. The Supreme Court
of New Hampshire, in affirming the trial court's damage award, held the New York
Times standard inapplicable. Baer v. Rosenblatt, 106 N.H. 26, 203 A.2d 773 (1964).
The United States Supreme Court reversed, and remanded the case to the state court
with instructions that it hear new evidence to determine whether plaintiff was a
public official. Id. at 86-88. The fact that plaintiff was no longer in public office when
the statement was published was not held controlling when the matter was still of
public interest. Id. at 87 n.14. However, the Court stated:
[T]here may be cases where a person is so far removed from a former position
of authority that comment on the manner in which he performed his responsi-
bilities no longer has the interest necessary to justify the New York Times rule.
Id.
In the following cases, the individuals involved were either implicitly or
explicitly held to be public officials: Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279 (1971) (Chicago
deputy chief of police detectives) ; Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265 (1971)
(candidates for elective public office) ; Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563
(1968) (members of local schoolboard); St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727
(1968) (local deputy sheriff) ; Beckley Newspapers Corp. v. Hanks, 389 U.S. 81
(1967) (county clerk).
[ VOL. 20
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In Time, Inc. v. Hill,23 the Court applied the New York Times stand-
ard to an action under a right of privacy statute,24 concluding that the
statute conflicted with the constitutional guarantees of speech and of the
press. As the Court stated:
We have no doubt that the subject of the Life article, the opening
of a new play linked to an actual incident, is a matter of public in-
terest. . . .Erroneous statement is no less inevitable in such a case
than in the case of comment upon public affairs, and in both, if inno-
cent or merely negligent, ". . . it must be protected .... ,,25
Nevertheless, Justice Brennan, who wrote for the majority, cautioned
that Hill was a right of privacy action and not a libel action.26 But the
readiness of the Court to look to the public interest of the subject rather
than to the status of the individuals logically led to the application of the
public interest test to libel actions. 27
23. 385 U.S. 374 (1967). In 1952, Hill and his family were held hostage in their
home for nineteen hours by escaped convicts, before being released unharmed. Id. at
378. Three years later, Life magazine falsely stated that a new Broadway play reen-
acting the Hill family's experience was opening soon. Id. at 377. Plaintiff Hill sued
under New York's right of privacy statute and was awarded compensatory damages
by the court. Id. at 376 & n.1, 378-79. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed.
Time, Inc. v. Hill, 15 N.Y.2d 986, 207 N.E.2d 604, 260 N.Y.S.2d 7 (1965). On
writ of certiorari, the United States Supreme Court reversed and held the New York
Times standard applicable. 385 U.S. at 387-88.
24. The statute provides in pertinent part:
§ 50. Right of privacy.
A person, firm or corporation that uses for advertising purposes, or for the
purpose of trade, the name, portrait or picture of any living person without having
first obtained the written consent of such person, or if a minor of his or her parent
or guardian, is guilty of a misdemeanor.
§ 51. Action for injunction and for damages.
Any person whose name, portrait or picture is used within this state for adver-
tising purposes or for the purposes of trade without the written consent first
obtained as above provided may maintain an equitable action in the supreme court
of this state against the person, firm or corporation so using his name, portrait
or picture, to prevent and restrain the use thereof; and may also sue and recover
damages for any injuries sustained by reason of such use and if the defendant
shall have knowingly used such person's name, portrait or picture in such manner
as is forbidden or declared to be unlawful by the last section, the jury, in its
discretion, may award exemplary damages.
N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50-51 (McKinney 1948).
25. 385 U.S. at 388.
26. Justice Brennan added that:
Were this a libel action, the distinction which has been suggested between the
relative opportunities of the public official and the private individual to rebut
defamatory charges might be germane. And the additional state interest in the
protection of the individual against damage to his reputation would be involved.
Id. at 391.
27. See id. at 387-88; Comment, Privacy, Defamation and the First Amendment:
The Implications of Time, Inc. v. Hill, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 926, 951-52 (1967) ; Note,
The Scope of First Amendment Protection for Good-Faith Defamatory Error, 75
YALE L.J. 642, 648 (1966). Contra, Nimmer, The Right to Speak from Times to
Time: First Amendment Theory Applied to Libel and Misapplied to Privacy, 56 CALIF.
L. REV. 935, 955 (1968) (criticism of combining private and public figure concepts).
1974-19751
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In Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts2 8 and its companion case, Associated
Press v. Walker 2 9 the Supreme Court tergiversated from the approach used
in Hill and focused on the status of the defamed individual. Although the
Court agreed that constitutional protection should be extended to defama-
tory statements concerning public figures as well as public officials, no
majority could agree on a controlling rationale concerning the extent of
that protection. However, five Justices, in three separate opinions, urged
application of the New York Times standard to all cases involving public
figures ;80 the remaining four Justices applied a restricted Times standard
to such cases.8 1
Announcing the judgments of the Court, Justice Harlan expounded
the rule adopted by a minority of the Court.32 He stated that:
[T]he rigorous federal requirements of New York Times are not the
only appropriate accommodation of the conflicting interests at stake.
... [A] "public figure" who is not a public official may also recover
damages for a defamatory falsehood whose substance makes substantial
danger to reputation apparent, on a showing of highly unreasonable
conduct constituting an extreme departure from the standards of
investigation and reporting ordinarily adhered to by responsible pub-
lishers. 83
28. 388 U.S. 130 (1967). In Butts, plaintiff, an athletic director of the University
of Georgia, alleged that the Saturday Evening Post falsely reported that in a telephone
conversation with University of Alabama football coach Paul Bryant, he had given
information to Bryant which was to result in a "fix" of an upcoming game between the
two schools. Id. at 135-37. Although a jury verdict resulted in judgment for plaintiff
of $60,000 general damages and $3,000,000 punitive damages, on remittitur, the judg-
ment was reduced to $400,000. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 225 F. Supp. 916, 920
(N.D. Ga. 1964), aff'd 351 F.2d 702 (5th Cir. 1965), aff'd 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
29. 388 U.S. 130 (1967). In Walker, plaintiff, a retired army general, instituted
a defamation action against Associated Press, alleging that Associated Press mis-
stated his participation in riots which had occurred on a college campus. Id. at 140-41.
The news dispatch stated that Walker had advised the crowd to use violence and
that he had led them in a charge against federal marshals. Id. at 140. Even though
a verdict was returned in favor of plaintiff for $500,000 compensatory damages and
$300,000 punitive damages, the trial court judge refused to enter judgment for
the punitive damages because there was no evidence of actual malice. Id. at 140-41.
Although the Texas Court of Civil Appeals affirmed, Associated Press v. Walker,
393 S.W.2d 671 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965), the United States Supreme Court reversed.
388 U.S. at 142. See generally Note, The Constitutional Law of Defamation and
Privacy: Butts and Walker, 53 CORNELL L. REv. 649 (1968).
30. The three opinions were filed by Chief Justice Warren, Justice Black joined
by Justice Douglas, and Justice Brennan joined by Justice White. 388 U.S. at 162,
170, 172.
31. Justice Harlan, joined by Justices Clark, Stewart, and Fortas, espoused this
viewpoint. Id. at 133.
32. An opinion joined by a minority of the Court is not within the rule of stare
decisis. E.g., 21 C.J.S. COURTS § 189(a) (1940).
33. 388 U.S. at 155.
[VOL. 20
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Refusing to accept Justice Harlan's standard, Chief Justice Warren
advocated that an unrestricted New York Times standard should be applied
to all public figures.34 This rule was adopted by a majority of the Court.3
In Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.,30 the Supreme Court returned
to the Hill analysis and considered the public interest of the subject matter
rather than the status of the participants. The plurality of the Court
37
observed that New York Times and the decisions following it concerned
discussion of events which were of public interest, despite the fact that
the participants in those events were public, officials, public figures, or
private individuals. 38  Characterizing the distinction between these cate-
gories as artificial,3 9 the Court stated that the public's right to know about
a certain event should depend on whether !it was. "a matter of public
or general interest. '40 Therefore, the Court extended "constitutional pro-
tection to all discussion and communication inyolving matters of public
or general concern, without regard to whether the persons involved are
34. Id. at 164 (Warren, C.J., concurring). Nevertheless, Chief Justice Warren
concurred in both results because, after applying ihe Times standard, he concluded
that Butts was able to prove actual malice whereas Walker was not.
35. Justice Black and Justice Douglas dissented in Butts, but concurred in
Walker " 'in order for the Court to be able at this.time to agree on [a disposition of]
this important case based on the prevailing constitutional doctrine expressed in New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan,'" 388 U.S. at 170 (Black, J., concurring in Walker and
dissenting in Butts), quoting Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 37.4, 398 (1967) (Black, J.,
concurring). However, they still adhered to the view "that the First Amendment
was intended to leave the press [absolutely] free from the, harassment of libel judg-
ments." 388 U.S. at 172.
Justice Brennan and Justice White concurred in Walker and dissented in
Butts. Id. (Brennan, J., concurring in Walker and dissenting in Butts). They agreed
with Chief Justice Warren that the New York Times standard should apply to public
figures; however, they concluded that neither Walkei nor Butts had proved actual
malice.
36. 403 U.S. 29 (1971). In Rosenbloom, plaintiff, a distributor of nudist maga-
zines, was arrested twice on obscenity charges. .Id. at 32-33'. Alleging that the maga-
zines were not obscene, plaintiff subsequently filed suit against city officials to enjoin
the police from further interfering with his business. Id. at 34. Defendant's radio
station aired a broadcast about the legal action, referring to plaintiff and two other
publishers as "girlie book peddlers" and characterizing the suit as an attempt to get
the police "to lay off the smut literature racket." Idi at 34. However, plaintiff was
not mentioned by name. Id. After plaintiff was acquitted on obscenity charges, he
instituted a libel suit against Metromedia. Id. at 36. The trial judge failed to hold
the New York Times standard applicable. See id. at 39-40. Finding for the plaintiff,
the jury awarded $25,000 general damages and $725,000 punitive damages, which was
reduced to $250,000 on remittitur. Id. at 40. Although Metromedia filed for judgment
n.o.v., it was denied. George Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 289 F. Supp. 737
(E.D. Pa. 1968). Reversing the trial judge's denial of judgment n.o.v., the Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit held the Times standard applicable despite the fact
that plaintiff was neither a public official nor public figure., George A. Rosenbloom v.
Metro-media, Inc., 415 F.2d 892, 896 (3d Cir. 1969). The Supreme Court affirmed, 403
U.S. at 57.
37. Justice Brennan wrote the opinion, joined by Chief-Justice Burger and Justice
Blackmun. Justice Black and Justice White wrote separate opinions concurring in
the result. For a discussion of what effect a plurality opinion has, see note 32 supra.
38. 403 U.S. at 44.
39. Id. at 41.
40. Id. at 44.
1974-1975]
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famous or anonymous."' 1  The Rosenbloom Court reasoned that, by af-
fording constitutional protection on the basis of whether a matter was of
public or general concern, both the public interest in protecting first amend-
ment freedom of speech and of the press and the private interest in protect-
ing the individual's reputation would be better served. 42  Nevertheless,
this constitutional protection would be lost if the plaintiff proved the
publication was made with actual malice.43
Justice Harlan dissented, expressing the view that in cases not in-
volving a public official or public figure, the plaintiff should prove at least
negligence on the part of the defendant in publishing the alleged defamatory
statements. 44 He also advocated that the plaintiff prove actual damages as
a requisite for recovery,45 with damages limited to those which were reason-
ably foreseeable upon publication.40 However, if plaintiff could prove that
the defendant published with actual malice, Justice Harlan would allow
recovery of punitive damages where "the amount of punitive damages
awarded bears a reasonable and purposeful relationship to the harm done."'47
in a separate dissenting opinion, Justices Marshall and Stewart, as did
Justice Harlan, espoused adoption of a standard requiring proof of at least
negligence in publication of defamatory statements. 48 Although they would
have permitted recovery for actual losses, 49 Justices Marshall and Stewart,
unlike Justice Harlan, rejected allowance of punitive damages.50
The minority views of Justices Harlan, Marshall, and Stewart in
R,6senbloom have been of tremendous import. With the change in the
personnel of the Supreme Court,5' and with Justice Blackman's especially
strong belief in the need for a majority position,52 these views coalesced
to form the majority rationale in Gertz.
Writing for the majority in Gertz,53 Justice Powell began by recog-
nizing that coextensive with society's interest in protecting some defama-
tory statements, in order to avoid censorship of the news media, was the
41. Id. (footnote omitted).
42. Id. at 49-51.
43. Id. at 52. For a discussion of the meaning of "actual malice" in this context,
see note 15 supra.
44. 403 U.S. at 64 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
45. Id.
46. Id. at 68.
47. Id. at 75.
48. Id. at 86 & n.12, 87 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
49. Id. at 86.
50. Id.
51. Justice Black and Justice Harlan were replaced on the Court by Justice
Powell and Justice Rehnquist.
52. In Rosenbloom, Justice Blackmun joined in the plurality opinion because he
believed the extension of the New York Times standard to an event of public or
general concern constituted a logical progression. 403 U.S. at 29. However, Justice
Blackmun concurred in the opinion and judgment of the Court in Gertz, because he
believed a majority rationale was paramount. 418 U.S. at 353.
53. Justice Powell was joined by Justices Marshall, Stewart, Rehnquist, and
Blackmun. Id. at 324.
[VOL. 20
8
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 3 [1975], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol20/iss3/5
9.RECENT, DEVELOPMENTAS
state interest in' compensating defamed. individuals for actual injury suf-
fered because of those statements.54  Then returning to the Butts approach,
the Court distinguished between public officials and public figures on the
one hand, and private individuals on the ,other.. i The Gertz majority re-
affirmed the applicabilityof the New York Timest standard in suits involv-
ing public officials and public figures, but refused to apply that rigorous
standard in actions concerning private individuAls. 55
The Court.weighed society's interest. in, anuninhibited press against
the competing state interest in compensating defamed individuals for injury
to their reputations.50 In concluding that the, state interest was more com-
pelling, the Court considered two factors to be determinative. First, the
Gertz Court noted that private. individuals; unlikepublic officials or public
figures, lacked access to the media to. rebut. . dfamatory falsehoods and
redress injury to their reputations. 57 Therefore,.private individuals were
more vulnerable to injury and the state interest in protecting their reputa-
tion was greater.58  Second, the Court posited: that public officials and
public figures "have voluntarily exposed s themselves to increased risk of
injury from defamatory falsehoods' concerning! them."'5 9 Public officials
accepted closer public scrutiny, by seekingoffice and public figures invited
attention and comment, by the nature' of!their ,activities.60 On the other
hand, private individuals neither Isought office. nor 'thrust their personality
"into the 'vortex' of an important public! controversy." 6' Therefore, the
Court concluded that the need of private individuals to be compensated for
injury caused by defamatory statements was greater and that such indi-
viduals were more deserving 9ffecovery.62
Since private, individuals were more .vulnprable to injury and were
more warranted in recovering,' the Court determined that the state interest
outweighed society's interest. The Court. reasoned that the New York
Times standard would deleteriously affect this legitimate state interest, and
thus refused to apply. it.63' Rather, the responsibility was conferred upon
.the states to define a standard of liability, as, long as it was not liability
without fault, to be applied to publishers, of defamatory statements injurious
to private individuals.6 4
The Gertz Court refused to abjure. the! distinction between public offi-
cials, public figures, and private individuals' and declined to apply the
54. Id. at 341-42.
55. Id. at 343.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 344.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 345.
60. Id.
61. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 1-55 (1967). See 418 U.S.
at 345.
62. 418 U.S. at 345.
63. Id. at 346.
64. Id. at 347-48.
11974-1.975]
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Rosenbloom public or general interest test.6 5 Repudiation by the Court
of the rationale advanced by the plurality in Rosenbloom was based on two
considerations. First, the Court stated that the extension of the Times
standard to matters of public or general interests would adequately serve
neither the state's nor society's interest. On one hand, extending the Times
rule would afford insufficient rights to the states to enforce a legal remedy
for defamed private individuals. 6 Under the Times standard, the meri-
torious claim of a defamed private individual would go uncompensated if
he failed to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the publi-
cation was made with actual malice. The Court found this impermissible,
given the greater state interest in protecting the individual. 67 On the
other hand, the Court reasoned that extending the Times rule would pro-
duce media self-censorship. If a publisher's defamatory statement was
found not to concern an issue of public or general interest, he would be
liable for both general and punitive damages, despite the care he took to
insure the veracity of the statements.6 8 To avoid liability, the news media
would refrain from publishing anything which they determined might
subject them to potential liability; this, the Court reasoned, would result
in media self-censorship and thus, be impermissible. 69
Second, the extension of the Times standard to matters of public or
general concern would force state and federal judges to determine on an
ad hoc basis what issues are of general or public interest.70 As stated by
Justice Marshall in his dissent in Rosenbladm:
[C]ourts are not simply to take a poll to determine whether a sub-
stantial portion of the population is interested or concerned in a sub-
ject, courts will be required to somehow pass on the legitimacy of
interest in a particular event or subject. 71
The biases and prejudices of the judges could color their determination of
matters of public interest, and the popularity or unpopularity of the issue
could also influence their determination. The Gertz majority doubted "the
wisdom of committing this task to the conscience of judges. z72 Even though
the Court had the opportunity to determine matters of public or general
interest, the majority decided that any ad hoc determination would result
in uncertainty for both private individuals and the news media.73
The Court feared the jury's rather uncontrolled discretion to award
damages far in excess of any actual injury. Therefore, unless the defamed
individual proved that the publication was made with actual malice, pre-
65. See notes 36-41 and accompanying text supra.
66. 418 U.S. at 346.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. See id. at 346, 348.
70. Id. at 346.
71. 403 U.S. at 79 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
72. 418 U.S. at 346.
73. Id.
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sumed or punitive damages were not recoverable. 74 Presumed damages
"invite juries to punish unpopular opinion rather than to compensate in-
dividuals for injury sustained by the publication of a false fact."7 5 Punitive
damages function as "private fines levied by civil juries to punish repre-
hensible conduct and to deter its future occurrence. '76 Also, both presumed
and punitive damages would result in a windfall for the plaintiff. Unless
presumed damages and punitive damages were eliminated, and actual in-
jury77 made a prerequisite to recovery, restriction of first amendment free-
doms of speech and of the press would result.
Although the Court refused to extend the New York Times standard
to private individuals, the respondent claimed that petitioner Gertz was
either a public official or a public figure. Consequently, the respondent
contended that the Times standard should still apply. 8 Respondent argued
that though Gertz did not hold any governmental office when the defama-
tory statements were made, his appearance at the coroner's inquest made
74. Id. at 349-50. Since the Supreme Court's decision in Gertz, several courts
have faced the issue of whether punitive damages are recoverable in the case of a
public figure where actual malice is established. In Maheu v. Hughes Tool Co., 384
F. Supp. 166 (C.D. Cal. 1974), after a bifurcated trial, the jury found for the plaintiff,
on the issue of liability. Id. at 168. On the issue of damages, defendant tool com-
pany filed a motion for partial summary judgment pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 56(a),
challenging the constitutionality of awarding punitive damages to a public figure.
Id. The court held that the first amendment precluded recovery of punitive damages
in public figure defamation cases; therefore, section 3294 of the California Civil Code,
CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294 (West 1970), insofar as it authorized punitive damages, was
unconstitutional. Id. at 173-74. As the court stated:
Because it would be difficult to objectively supervise the exercise of the jury's
discretion in this tender First Amendment area and because unlimited, discre-
tionary awards of punitive damages do not narrowly and necessarily promote the
special state interest to protect the reputation and privacy of public figures from
special dangers flowing from highly malicious tortious defamation, i.e., the
greater probability that harm will be inflicted and that the magnitude of the harm
will be larger, this court concludes that the First Amendment precludes plaintiff's
recovery of punitive damages.
Id.
However, in Davis v. Schuchat, 510 F.2d 731 (D.C. Cir. 1975), the court
allowed punitive damages where actual malice was proven. The court rejected the
defendant's argument that punitive damages were unconstitutional, stating that their
reading of the majority opinion in Gertz allowed punitive damages if the New York
Times actual malice standard was met. See Goldwater v. Ginzburg, 414 F.2d 324 (2d
Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1049 (1970) (mental and physical health of Presi-
denial candidate Barry Goldwater) (although the case was decided before Gertz,
the circuit court considered punitive damages allowable in public official defamation
cases where actual malice was established; id. at 340-41).
75. 418 U.S. at 349.
76. Id. at 350. For examples of cases wherein courts have determined that jury
awards of punitive damages were excessive, see notes 29 & 36 supra.
77. The Supreme Court did not define the parameters of actual damage, leaving
it to the trial courts to frame appropriate instructions in defamation actions. How-
ever, the Court did say that actual injury was "not limited to out-of-pocket loss,"
and may include "impairment of reputation and standing in the community, personal
humiliation, and mental anguish and suffering." 418 U.S. at 349-50.
78. Id. at 351. 11
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him a "de facto public official."' 79 The Court rejected this argument, stat-
•ing that prior cases did not recognize any such concept.80 Furthermore, if
respondent's argument had been accepted, severe distortion of the definition
of public -officials would have resulted.81
Respondent also argued that petitioner Gertz was a public figure.b
2
Because Gertz had been active in local civic groups and professional or-
ganizations, and had authored several books and articles, respondent urged
that Gertz had achieved national prominence, and thus, was a public figure.88
Refuting this argument, the Court stated that if an individual gained "per-
suasive fame or notoriety," he may be a public figure for "all purposes
and in all contexts. '8 4 Here, however, Gertz had not achieved any national
prominence. The respondent further argued that petitioner's involvement
in the Nuccio affair had made him a public figure. In rejecting this argu-
ment, the Court stated that if an individual "voluntarily injects himself
or is drawn into a particular public controversy," 85 he may be a public
figure for "a limited range of issues."8 Here, however, Gertz had par-
ticipated in the coroner's inquest only to the extent of representing his
client. He took no part in Nuccio's criminal prosecution, nor did he speak
to the news media about the criminal or civil litigation against Nuccio.
Hence, the Court deemed the petitioner a private individual for purposes
of the law of defamation. 87
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Since the Supreme Court had not defined public figure in Butts, the lower
courts have fashioned their own guidelines for determining whether an individual is
a public figure. To be a public figure, an individual must be a nationally prominent
person, Walker v. Courier-Journal and Louisville Times Co., 246 F. Supp. 231, 233-34
(W.D. Ky. 1965), rev'd on other grounds, 368 F.2d 189 (6th Cir. 1966); or the
individual must have voluntarily thrust himself into a discussion on issues of public
interest, Pauling v. Globe-Democrat Co., 362 F.2d 188, 195, 197 (8th Cir. 1966),
cert. denied, 388 U.S. 909 (1967). This definition has subsequently been adopted by
the Supreme Court in Greenbelt Coop. Publish. Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6,
8-9 (1970).
83. See 418 U.S. at 351.
84. 418 U.S. at 351. Before the Supreme Court would deem an individual a
public figure "for all purposes and in all contexts," clear evidence of the person's
prominence or involvement in the affairs of society was required. Id. at 352. "We
would not lightly assume that a citizen's participation in community and professional
affairs rendered him a public figure for all purposes." Id.
85. Id. at 351.
86. Id.
87. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Douglas, Brennan, and White dissented
separately. Taking a pragmatic approach, Chief Justice Burger viewed the law of
defamation as having developed in a uniform manner consistent with a basic rationale
in both the state and federal courts. 418 U.S. at 354 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). He,
therefore, unlike the majority, would not have abandoned the previous development
with respect to private individuals. Consequently, he would have reinstated the verdict
of the jury and entered judgment on that verdict. Id. at 355 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
Justice Douglas adhered to the belief, which he shared with the late Justice
Black, that the news media should be absolutely immune from liability for defamation
actions. Id. at 356 (Douglas, J., dissenting). See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Grove,
Trustee, et al., 404 U.S. 898, 903-04 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting from denial of
[VOL. 20
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Although the Court in Gertz has laid down broad rules of general
applicability and has supposedly "come to rest in the defamation area,""8
this decision is subject to some criticism. First, the Court's assertion that
lack of access to the media to reply to defamatory statements justified
refusal to extend the New York Times standard to private individuals was
not founded on empirical data, and, as the majority acknowledged, "an
opportunity for rebuttal seldom sufficies to undo harm of defamatory false-
hood."8 9 Furthermore, in making this assertion, the Court failed to con-
sider the justification elaborated in New York Times for establishing a
constitutional privilege in defamation actions. That justification was to
insure that "debate on public issues [w]ould be uninhibited, robust, and
certiorari) ; Curtis Pub. Co. v. Butts and Associated Press v. Walker, 388 U.S. 130,
170-72 (1967) (Black, J., joined by Douglas, J., concurring in Walker and dissenting
in Curtis) ; Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 398-402 (1967) (Black, J., and Douglas,
J., concurring separately) ; Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 79-83 (1964) (Black,
J., joined by Douglas, J., concurring); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254, 293-97 (1964) (Black, J., joined by Douglas, J., concurring). See also Cahn,
Justice Black and First Amendment 'Absolutes': A Public Interview, 37 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 549 (1962); Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note on "The Central
Meaning of the First Amendment," 1964 Sup. CT. REV. 191, 219. He viewed the first
amendment, made applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment, as bar-
ring the states from passing any libel laws. 418 U.S. at 357 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
Therefore, Justice Douglas would have affirmed the court of appeals decision and
denied recovery. Id. at 360.
Justice Brennan reiterated the position he expressed in Rosenbloom that the
New York Times standard should extend to all matters of public or general concern.
Id. at 361 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Consequently, Justice Brennan would have
affirmed the court of appeals and denied recovery. Id. at 369.
Justice White would have reinstated the verdict of the jury. He argued that
the Court's decision unnecessarily invaded the prerogatives of the states by federalizing
major aspects of the libel law. Id. at 370 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White stated:
No longer will the plaintiff be able to rest his case with proof of a libel defama-
tory on its face or proof of a slander historically actionable per se. In addition,
he must prove some further degree of culpable conduct on the part of the pub-
lisher, such as intentional or reckless falsehood or negligence. And if he succeeds
in this respect, he faces still another obstacle: recovery for loss of reputation will
be conditioned upon "competent" proof of actual injury to his standing in
the community.
Id. at 375-76.
Justice White continued to subscribe to the decisions in New York Times
and Butts. Although he believed that the first amendment protected against "seditious
libel," Justice White argued that "recovery under common law standards for defama-
tory falsehoods about a private individual . . . [was] not forbidden by the First
Amendment." Id. at 399. Therefore, he would continue to allow the following: the
states to administer the law of defamation and the right of the private individual to
recover for false statements; a judgment for nominal damages, "the practical effect
of. such a judgment being a judicial declaration that the publication was indeed false,"
"in the case of defamations not actionable per se, the recovery of general damages for
injury to reputation ... if some form of material or pecuniary loss is proved," and
he would continue to allow punitive damages recovery of compensatory damages
without a showing of fault. Id. at 376.
88. 418 U.S. at 354.
89. Id. at 344 n.9. For a discussion of the media's power and influence, see
Shapo, Media Injuries to Personality: An Essay on Legal Regulation of Public Com-
munication, 46 TEXAs L. REV. 650 (1968).
1974,-1975]
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wide-open,"90 by giving "effect to the [First] Amendment's function to
encourage ventilation of public issues." 91 Access or lack of access to the
media was not germane to this justification. Moreover, the problem of
lack of access to the media might be rectified, as suggested by Justice
Brennan, by the use of retraction and right of reply statutes. 92
In permitting the states to impose their own standards of liability
where the defamatory statement " 'makes substantial danger to reputation
apparent,'"03 the Court subordinated the possibility of censorship to the
state interest in protecting the reputations of defamed priviate individuals.
The states may impose any standard of liability9 4 except liability without
fault. If the state imposed an ordinary negligence standard, censorship
of the media may result because of the difficulty in defining negligenceYi
In dissenting Justice Brennan's words, if this standard was adopted, the
news media would be faced with "'the intolerable burden of guessing how
a jury might assess the reasonableness of steps taken by it to verify the
accuracy of every reference to a name, picture or portrait.' "909 However,
if the state imposed a gross negligence standard, it is questionable whether
90. 376 U.S. at 270.
91. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 46 (1971).
92. Id. at 47 n.15. The right to reply argument has been substantially weakened
since on the same day Gertz was decided, the Court held in Miami Herald Publish.
Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974), that a state cannot guarantee the right to reply.
In Tornillo, plaintiff, a teachers' collective bargaining agent, had been a candidate for
the Florida House of Representatives. Id. at 243. When defendant publishing com-
pany criticized the plaintiff and his candidacy in its newspaper editorials, plaintiff
sought to have defendant print his replies to the editorials pursuant to Florida's right
of reply statute, FLA. STAT. § 104.38 (1971). 418 U.S. at 243-44. Defendant refused
to print the replies; thereafter, plaintiff brought suit under the statute seeking in-
junctive and declaratory relief and actual and punitive damages. Id. at 244. Defendant
argued that the statute was unconstitutional. Id. at 245. The Circuit Court for
Dade County held that the statute violated the first amendment guarantee of freedom
of the press and was, therefore, unconstitutional. Miami Herald Publish. Co. v.
Tornillo, 38 Fla. Supp. 80 (1972). The Supreme Court of Florida, upholding the
statute, reversed. Miami Herald Publish. Co. v. Tornillo, 287 So. 2d 78 (Fla. 1973).
In a unanimous opinion delivered by Chief Justice Burger, the United States Supreme
Court held that the statute violated the first amendment guarantee of freedom of the
press. 418 U.S. at 258. The Court held that "press responsibility is not mandated by
the Constitution and like many other virtues it cannot be legislated." 418 U.S. at 256.
Although Tornillo involved a statute which granted the right to reply only to a
political candidate, its rationale could plausibly be applied to private individuals.
Furthermore, the same rationale could be used to hold retraction statutes unconstitu-
tional. 418 U.S. at 368 n.3 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See Comment, Reply and
Retraction In Actions Against the Press for Defamation: The Effect Of Tornillo
and Gertz, 43 FORDHAm L. REv. 223 (1974); Note, Vindication Of the Reputation
Of a Public Official, 80 HARv. L. REV. 1730 (1967); Note, Conflict Within the First
Amendment: A Right of Access to Newspapers, 48 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1200 (1973);
Comment, The Right Of Reply: An Alternative To an Action For Libel, 34 VA. L.
REv. 867 (1948).
93. 418 U.S. at 348, quoting Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130,
155 (1967).
94. See W. PROSSER, supra note 6, § 34, at 183-84.
95. 418 U.S. at 355 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
96. Id at 366 (Brennan, J., dissenting), quoting Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374,
389 (1967). 14
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censorship of the media would result. Although several courts have con-
strued gross negligence "as requiring wilful misconduct, or recklessness," 97
most courts consider that "gross negligence falls short of a reckless dis-
regard of consequences .... ,,9s Although a gross negligence standard
might differ from the New York Times actual malice standard, a forceful
argument could be made that a gross negligence standard would still afford
sufficient first amendment space for free expression.
The possibility of these varying definitions of negligence may lead to
lack of uniformity of the law between the states and result in a dilution
of the freedoms of speech and of the press. Therefore, the Supreme Court
may be required to forge a constitutional definition of negligence. In addi-
tion, since liability without fault is also difficult to define,9 9 the Court may
also have to develop a constitutional definition of this concept.
The Gertz Court refused to extend the New York Times rule to
matters of public or general interest because "this approach would lead
to unpredictable results and uncertain expectations, and it could render
[the Supreme Court's] duty to supervise the lower courts unmanageable." 0
In making this statement the Court ignored the considerable number of
lower court decisions which have articulated a definition of a matter of
public or general concern. 101 Furthermore, the Court failed to acknowledge
its own ability to articulate standards which would better guide judges in
determining what issues are of public or general interest. Instead of
discarding the entire rationale of Rosenbloon,102 the Court might have
tried to ameliorate the approach adopted therein. Then, when defamation
cases did arise, judges could look to the guidelines established by the
Supreme Court, as well as to the already sizeable body of case law, to
determine issues of public interest.
Prior to Rosenblatt, the objection to ad hoc determination by judges
could have been made with respect to public officials. 10 3 However, since the
Court articulated a public official standard in Rosenblatt, very few deter-
mination problems have occurred. A similar argument could be made by
analogy with respect to public interest; if the scope of matters of public
or general interest were articulated clearly, the Court's concern with ad
hoc determination might have been abated.
Because the Court believed the state interest extended only to com-
pensating defamed private individuals for actual injury, presumed or puni-
tive damages were not recoverable absent a showing of actual malice as
required in New York Times. In effect, this eliminated recovery for all
97. W. PROSSER, supra note 6, § 34, at 183 (footnotes omitted).
98. Id.
99. 418 U.S. at 379-80 (White, J., dissenting).
100. Id. at 343.
101. See Comment, The Expanding Constitutional Protection for the News Media
from Liability for Dafamation: Predictability and the New Synthesis, 70 MIcH. L.
REv. 1547, 1560-62 nn.93-96 (1972).
102. 403 U.S. 29 (1971). See note 36 and accompanying text supra.
103. 383 U.S. 75 (1966). See notes 21-22 supra.
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libels which were defamatory on their face, and all slanders which histor-
ically were actionable per se.' 04 To recover, the allegedly defamed indi-
vidual must prove culpability on the part of the publisher, i.e., that the
publisher acted either in negligence or in reckless disregard of the truth.
In addition, he must prove actual injury to his reputation. Unfortunately,
some of the effects of a defamatory statement are subtle and not capable
of proof in court ;105 therefore, an individual with a meritorious claim may
not be fully compensated. Thus, the common law presumption of general
damages may be necessary to compensate for the harm inflicted by the
defamation.
According to the Gertz majority, punitive damages were a product
of uncontrolled jury discretion; fear of exorbitant punitive damage awards
led to self-censorship of the media. Therefore, the Court prohibited recovery
of punitive damages, unless New York Times actual malice was shown;
this achieved control over the jury's discretion while avoiding self-censor-
ship of the media. This was a short-sighted view, however, for concomi-
tant with the jury's discretion to award punitive damages is its ability
to compensate for a broad range of actual injury. The Court did not at-
tempt to restrain the jury's discretion in compensating actual injury.
Arguably, therefore, the damage award which plaintiff was precluded from
receiving because of the elimination of punitive damages could still be
given to him under the guise of compensation for actual harm.10 6 To fur-
ther exacerbate the problem, the states could "fashion novel rules for the
recovery of damages."'1 7 This could result in large damage awards if the
newly fashioned rules were used in conjunction with the customary types
of actual harm inflicted by a defamatory falsehood ;108 or it could result in
a damage award where otherwise there would be no recovery at all.
Because of these potential problems, it is likely that, in the future, the
Court will be forced to fashion a constitutional definition of actual injury.
If such a definition were developed, the Court would have to employ the
same analysis used in Gertz and balance the interest of society in an un-
inhibited press against that of the individual in compensation for injury
from defamatory statements. In addition, the Court would have to decide
in each case whether the evidence was sufficient to meet the burden of
proving actual injury. Thus, the Court would be involved in an ad hoc
determination - supposedly the same evil which caused the Court to
104. At common law, slander was not actionable unless actual damage was proven.
However, four specific exceptions were established: imputation of crime; imputation
of a loathsome disease; imputation of unchastity to a woman; and slander affecting
the plaintiff in his business, trade, or profession. For this, no proof of actual harm
was required for nominal or substantial damages. See W. PROSSER, supra note 6,§ 112, at 754.
105. See id. at 765.
106. See note 77 supra; Wright, Defamation, Privacy, and the Public's Right to
Know: A National Problem and a New Approach, 46 TEXAS L. REv. 630 (1968).
107. 418 U.S. at 380 (White, J., dissenting).
108. See note 77 supra.
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